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The aim of this paper is to analyze the function of the informal sector in 
employment, its relationship to urban employment, with illustrative evidence 
from Colombia. The analysis is done for the period 1984  – 2000, which includes 
phases of boom and economic crisis as well as the implementation of neo-
liberal reforms to national development. The paper summarizes four competing 
approaches to the conceptualization of the informal sector, and describes their 
measurement strategies. It argues that elements of state regulation are 
fundamental whereas firm size should not be considered as a defining element. 
Subsequently, it analyzes how the internal composition of the informal sector 
evolved, considering elements of state regulation, firm size, and dynamism of 
the economic activities. It examines the function of the informal sub-sectors in 
the urban labor m arket, using indicators such as relative earnings and size, and 
a crude indicator of labor mobility. At least three sub-sectors conforming the 
informal sector are identified: salaried workers of large and small firms, 
entrepreneurs and subsistence workers. It is argued that each sub-sector of the 
informal sector responds in different ways to prevailing economic conditions. 
The subsistence sub-sector supports the dualistic view, whereas the other two 
are integrated to the formal sector.  No dominant sub-sector permits broad-
range generalizations about “the” informal sector. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
During 1990’s, “informal economy” seems have lost the interest and urgency 
characteristic among social  scientist during the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, 
the persistent economic and social downturn that characterized several Latin 
American countries, including Colombia, during the last decade resurrected 
interest in the informal economy. The term informal economy
1 covers a set of 
heterogeneous activities, from unpaid labor to any number of unregulated 
salaried jobs. This broad range of activities has made it difficult for analysts of 
the informal sector to agree on its definition. However, there is consensus o n 
two broads points: first, the informal economy is part of the economy at large, 
which determines its main characteristics and on which it depends; and second, 
the informal economy is largely defined by activities outside state regulation 
(Portes, 1994; B road, 2000). In spite of these two broad agreements, the 
reasons for the existence of unregulated activities and their function in 
employment differ and then the implications in terms of labor policies also differ.  
 
Some analysts consider the informal sector as the disadvantaged segment of a 
dualistic labor market and see today’s expansion of the informal economy as 
part of a more general deterioration of labor market conditions (Tokman, 1992; 
Klein and Tokman, 2000). Others view informal economy as unregulated 
income-earning activities closely related to the formal sector (Portes, 1997). Yet 
others see in the informal sector signs of incipient entrepreneurship and an 
escape from state regulation (Maloney, 2000). For others analysts, 
informalization is not  a recent phenomenon but it is a long term, large scale, 
and systemic phenomenon of the capitalist world-economy (Tabak, 2000). The 
issue of understanding the function of the informal sector in employment is 
essential for the design and evaluation of labor  policies. It becomes particular 
relevant to the Latin American region since most of the countries applied “neo-
liberal” reforms during the last decade that affected the labor market 
environment. The globalization of the economy, the privatization process a nd 
the flexibilization of labor markets has opened debates on establishing common 
                                                   
1 Informal economy and informal sector are interchangeable used here.    3
labor standards in regional free trade agreements and on the need to regulate 
labor markets to ensure neat international competition (Maloney, 1997; Klein 
and Tokman, 2000).  For the design of those and other labor policies it is 
necessary to understand if the informal sector functions as a buffer for 
employment or it is closely integrated to formal employment. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the function of the informal s ector in 
employment, its relationship to urban employment, with illustrative evidence 
from Colombia. The evolution of the Colombian urban informal sector and its 
function in employment is analyzed from 1984 to 2000. This period includes 
phases of boom and  economic crisis as well as the implementation of neo-
liberal reforms to national development, which provides the general context in 
which informality occurs. The paper summarizes four competing approaches to 
the conceptualization of the informal sector, and describes their measurement 
strategies. By doing a sensitivity analysis of the empirical definition of urban 
informal activities, I evaluate and adopt a specific definition. I argue that 
elements of state regulation are fundamental whereas firm size should not be 
considered as a defining element. Subsequently, I analyze how the internal 
composition of the informal sector evolved, considering elements of state 
regulation, firm size, and dynamism of the economic activities. I also examine 
the function of the informal sub-sectors in the urban labor market, using 
indicators such as relative earnings and size, and a crude indicator of labor 
mobility. At least three sub-sectors conforming the informal sector are identified: 
salaried workers of large and small firms, entrepreneurs and subsistence 
workers. I argue that each sub-sector of the informal sector responds in 
different ways to prevailing economic conditions. No dominant sub-sector 
permits broad-range generalizations about “the” informal sector. However, a  
general trend is observed in the labor market: an increasing deterioration of 
labor conditions for workers in both formal as well as informal sub-sectors. 
 
Colombian urban informal sector is an interesting case to further study for 
several reasons. First, roughly 50% of the urban labor force works in small firms 
with low levels of productivity and without labor protection (López, 1996; Caro, 
1995; Fedesarrollo, 2000; Henao et al., 1999). Second, during the last decade,   4
the Colombian economy experienced several structural “neo-liberal” reforms 
that significantly modified the labor market environment (Ocampo et al., 2000). 
Third, since late 1990’s, Colombia is facing one of the most severe economic 
crises since the Great Depression of the 30’s. 
 
2.  Economic Conditions during the 1984-2000 Period: An Overview 
 
Colombia, located in the northwest of South America, is considered a lower-
middle income country by international standards. With a current total 
population of nearly 43 million and an annual population growth rate of 1.8%, 
Colombia is the third largest country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico. 
Nearly 71% of its population lives in the urban areas, 15% in Bogotá, the capital 
of the country, and nearly 40% of urban population lives in the major four cities 
(Bogotá, Cali, Medellín and Barranquilla). 
 
Colombia, as other Latin American countries, has been experiencing major 
socio-demographic changes since the second half of the XX century: reductions 
in fertility and mortality, a process of urbanization, i mprovements in educational 
attainment and increases in female labor force participation (Flórez, 2000). 
During the last decade, several structural neo-liberal reforms were implemented 
to national development. Among the most important social reforms are the 
Labor Reform of 1990 and the Pensions and Health Insurance Reform of 1993. 
In 1990, the Labor Reform combined higher labor market flexibility with higher 
protection to labor union rights. It increased labor flexibility by facilitating 
temporary contracts, facilitating firing of workers with more than 10 years of 
experience in the firm but introducing a higher “indemizacion” instead, adopting 
an integral salary for high income workers (more than 10 minimum wages), and 
eliminating the higher labor costs implicit in the old regimen of “cesantias”
2 
(Ocampo, et al., 2000). However, the greater flexibility and the reduction of 
labor costs associated with the old regimen of “cesantias” have been 
                                                   
2 According to the regimen of “cesantias”, his/her average salary of the last two years worked 
and the number of years worked determined the payment to the worker at the moment of 
his/her retirement. This implied an increasing labor cost as a function of the number of years 
worked. The labor reform introduced a mandatory saving system in a “cesantia” fund for new 
workers.   5
counterbalanced by the higher costs of hiring new workers introduced  by the 
reform to the health insurance system.  
 
In 1993, Law 100 completely reformed the organization, financing and delivery 
of health services in Colombia, creating the “General System of Social Security 
in Health” (Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud  – SGSSS). Before 
1993, the Colombian National Health System had three parallel and 
independent sub-systems. 1) The Social Security System, an individual 
mandatory system for all public and private salaried employees. Employees and 
employers had to p ay 6% of salaries to finance this system (1/3 came from the 
employee and 2/3 from the employer). 2) The National Public Health System, 
an assistance system for poor population, based on supply subsidies. 3) The 
private health insurance system, available for high-income population (Tono T., 
2000).   
 
The 1993 health reform sought universal coverage, improving equity and quality 
of health services. It used three strategies: 1) a mandatory health insurance to 
increase coverage, 2) managed competition to improve efficiency, decrease 
costs, improve access, and increase quality of the health services, 3) a unified 
financing system with multiple subsidies and redistribute elements to decrease 
inequality. The first strategy looked for a universal coverage by creating two 
regimes: contributions and subsidies. The Contributing Regime (Régimen 
Contributivo) is an employment-based mandatory insurance system. All 
employees and the self-employed must pay 12% of their income to the 
“Solidarity Fund” (Fondo de Solidaridad y  Garantía) at the Ministry of Health. 
The employer pays 8% of the tax and the remaining 4% comes from of the 
employee’s earnings. Self-employed individuals must pay the entire 12% from 
their earnings
3. Their payments to the system increased from 6% in the old to 
12% in the new system. Poor individuals and the unemployed are enrolled in 
the “Subsidized Regimen” (Régimen Subsidiado). All enrollees in the system 
                                                   
3 According to Law 100, for an independent worker to enroll in the health system must pay 12% 
of at least 2 minimum wages. Those workers earning between 1 and 2 minimum wages do not 
earn enough income to pay the high cost of enrollment, but they can not enroll either in the 
subsidized regime because they are working. Therefore they are excluded from the health 
system.    6
obtain coverage for themselves and their families (non-working spouse or non-
working parent, children younger than 18 or younger than 25 years of age if 
they are full-time students). Therefore, the system went from individual to family 
coverage. The other two strategies included competition in the health sector 
market, substitution of supply subsidies by demand subsidies, and 
decentralization of public health expenditures (Plaza and Barona, 1999).  
 
Law 100 also reformed the pension system. It doubled the contribution 
(“cotizacion”) rate - from 6.5% to 13.5%, doubled the required minimum number 
of weeks w orked- from 500 to 1000, increased by two years the minimum age 
for pension  – from 55 to 57 for women and from 60 to 62 for men, and 
increased the base reference period for calculating the amount of pension  - 
from the last two to the last ten years worked  (ANIF, 2000). In the case of 
salaried employees, both employer and employees pay jointly the 13.5%. 
However, self-employed workers must pay this amount themselves. Overall, the 
1993 Pensions and Health Insurance reform increased labor costs of hiring a 
new worker from 12.5% to 25.5% (13.5% to pensions and 12% to health 
insurance). 
 
Additional social reforms occurred at the same time. The main element was the 
liberalization of the external transactions. A gradual process of trade 
liberalization began in the  second half of the 1980’s with the reduction in overall 
import tariffs. In 1990, stronger measures were introduced that virtual eliminated 
the licensing regime and cut average import tariffs by roughly half (Fajnzylber 
and Maloney, 2001). At the same time, free trade agreements were signed with 
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, as part of an intensification of regional trade 
integration. On the other hand, the capital account was opened in 1993 through 
two elements: the exchange reform (“reforma cambiaria”) and  the opening of 
direct external investment (Vélez et al, 2001; Ocampo et al, 2000). Political 
changes affecting the structure of the State also occurred at the beginning of 
the 1990’s. Among those, the new Political Constitution of 1991 and the Law 60 
of 1993 on fiscal decentralization are the most important ones.  
   7
At the macro level, Colombian economy was characterized, during the 1970’s 
and 1980’s, by a positive and sustained  – although moderate  – growth. Sound 
management of the economy allowed the country to go through the Latin 
American debt crisis of the early 1980’s without a significant drop in its growth 
rate. The end first half of the 1990’s was a period of economic boom  – as a 
consequence of accelerated expansion of internal aggregate demand  – but  it 
was accompanied by an increasing deterioration in the external balance of 
payments. The social and structural reforms and the redefinition of the State 
function that occurred at the beginning of the 1990’s were accompanied by 
increasing public spending  and fiscal imbalances. Public spending share went 
from 24% to 36% of GNP between 1990 and 1998 (Vélez et al, 2001). Fiscal 
imbalances began to rise after 1993, going from 0.3% to 5.9% of GNP in 1999 
(Ocampo et al, 2000). The increasing public spending and  fiscal imbalances 
slowed down economic growth after 1996, and took the economy into recession 
in 1998-99. By 1999, after two decades of positive growth, Colombia had 
reached negative figures in its economic growth rate (Figure 1). This severe 
economic crisis has translated into a lower employment rate, an increasing 
labor force participation rate, and an increasing unemployment rate (20.2% in 
2000) (Figure 1).  
 
Given the objective of this paper and using macroeconomic and labor market 
indicators (Figure 1), we can divide the1984-2000 period broadly into three 
phases: 
 
Phase 1 : 1984-1990, period of moderate growth before the implementation of 
structural reforms. GNP growth rate was positive, reaching 5.7% in 1987. 
Industrial production showed a positive and  sustained growth, whereas real 
industrial wages and the minimum wage were almost constant. Labor force 
participation, an indicator of labor supply, and employment rate, an indicator of 
labor demand, were both increasing, with a declining open unemployment rate. 
 
Phase 2 : 1991-1995, period of moderate growth along with the implementation 
of “neo-liberal” reforms. GNP growth rate was positive, increasing at the end of 
this period to a 5.8% in 1995. Industrial production had a steady positive growth   8
rate, whereas real industrial wages significantly increased since 1991, 
especially among white-collar workers. In contrast, minimum real wages remain 
almost constant. Labor force participation and employment rates behaved 
similarly: they increased slowly at the beginning of the period but declined 
slowly afterwards. Open unemployment was declining, reaching the lowest 
rates observed in the last two decades. These conditions may characterize this 
phase as an upturn economic cycle. 
 
Phase 3 : 1996-2000 is period of economic crisis. GNP growth rate steadily 
declined and reached negative figures in 1999 ( -1.9%). Industrial production 
also slowed down, and significantly declined by the end of the period. Real 
industrial wages continued to increase, especially among white-collar workers, 
increasing the wage gap differentials among white-collar and blue-collar 
workers. Labor force participation rates increased, especially at the end of the 
period, whereas employment rates were declining. Open unemployment 
significantly increased reaching the highest figure ever observed in Colombia: 
20.4% in June 2000.  
 
3.  Data 
 
I use data from the National Household Survey Program (ENH), carried out by 
the National Department of Statistics (DANE) since 1976, which is designed to 
gather quarterly information on the labor market in urban and rural areas. Every 
two years since 1984, the June survey has included a special module devoted 
to the informal sector
4. The survey is statistically representative of the main 10 
cities and its metropolitan areas
5.  Each survey interviews around 20,000 
households. This sample size permits estimates of relative size and earnings for 
each sub-sector of the labor market at two-year intervals for urban areas. 
 
                                                   
4 The 1990 June-survey is excluded from the analysis because of lack of comparability. The 
wording of the questions included in the informal sector module is different in that specific year. 
However, estimates for 1990 are sometimes  calculated as mean values between 1988 and 
1992. 
5 According to the 1993 Population census, about 66% of the urban population -- living in cities 
with 50.000 or more inhabitants-- was located in the ten main cities and their metropolitan areas 
(Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Cúcuta, Bucaramanga, Ibagué, Pereira  and  
Manizales).    9
4.  Competing approaches to the Urban Informal Sector 
 
4.1. Conceptual and methodological issues 
Keith Hart developed the concept of informal economy in the early 1970s as a 
result of a research project for the International Labor Office (ILO) on urban 
labor markets in Africa (Portes, 1994; Tokman, 1992). However, after  almost 
thirty years of research on informal activities, there is still no consensus on its 
definition. Four approaches can actually be identified.  
 
Writing for ILO / PREALC
6, Hart postulated a dualistic model of the urban labor 
force, applying the concept mainly to self-employed and characterizing informal 
activities as dynamic, diverse and operating in unregulated markets (Portes, 
1994). However, the dynamism and regulation features did not receive much 
attention by researchers and the focus of most analysis after Hart’s research 
was to study the working poor (Tokman, 1992). In fact, ILO / PREALC defines 
informality as synonymous with poverty, and their earliest estimates of the 
informal sector referred only to self-employed  – minus professional and 
technicians, unremunerated family workers, and domestic servants. After the 
1980s, and as a response to critiques about the large underestimate created by 
the omission of small enterprises workers, especially after decentralization and 
reorganization of the production and work processes at the global level, ILO / 
PREALC reviewed and modified its conceptualization of the informal sector, 
which includes regulation as a conceptual element and acknowledge a more 
heterogeneous informal sector (Portes, 1994; Tokman, 1992). However, 
informality is still seen under this view as a survival mechanism in response to 
insufficient modern job creation. However, the informal sector is still considered 
as the disadvantaged sector of a dualistic or segmented labor market not linked 
to formal activities. Rather during cyclical downturns, the informal sector grows 
as it absorbs displaced formal sector workers; informal earnings fall relative to 
those in the formal sector; the obverse occurs during economic recovery. The 
existence of  labor surplus lowers incomes and generates subsistence activities 
that are not dynamically linked to expanding modern sectors but provide a 
supply to low-income markets (Tokman, 1992). In fact, the revised ILO / 
                                                   
6 PREALC, an ILO affiliate stands for Latin American Regional Program on Employment.   10 
PREALC views the informal economy as the collection of marginal enterprises 
characterized by: low entry barriers in terms of skills, capital, and organization; 
family ownership enterprises; small scale of operation; labor intensive 
production with outdated technology; unregulated and competitive markets; low 
levels of productivity; and low levels of capacity for accumulation (Portes, 1994; 
Tokman, 1992). To measure the informal sector, this view uses entire class of 
worker: self-employed  – minus professional and technicians, unremunerated 
family workers, domestic servants, owners and salaried workers in small 
enterprises (“small enterprise” varies across countries, ranging from less than 
20 workers to less than 5). 
 
Second, the excessive regulated economy approach sees informality as the 
response to the rigidities and limitations of the mercantilist state (De Soto, 1989 
cited in Portes and Schauffler, 1993). Although the origin of the informal sector 
may have been a response to insufficient job creation, it expands in response to 
excess regulation of t he economy, inadequate labor and economic legislation, 
and inefficient bureaucracy. Thus, law, procedures and government are 
responsible for the existence of a large and increasing proportion of 
employment in low productivity and badly remunerated jobs (Tokman, 1992). 
This view derives from the experience of Peru and is based on the illegal pursuit 
of legal economic ends, focusing on three sectors: housing, transport, and petty 
commerce (Portes and Schauffler, 1993). 
 
Third, the structural articulation approach (Castells and Portes, 1989) 
characterizes the informal economy as income-earning activities unregulated by 
the state but closely interlinked with activities in the formal sector. The basic 
distinction between formal and informal activities relies entirely on the character 
of production and distribution processes, namely degree of compliance with the 
terms of the laws7. Although this approach emphasizes the function of the state 
in the emergence and growth of the informal economy, it does not see this 
sector as isolated from the formal economy or as composed exclusively of 
                                                   
7 This view clearly differentiates criminal activities from informal activities. The first ones 
specialize in the production of goods and services socially defined as illicit (like drugs), whereas 
informal activities refer to unregulated (illicit) production and distribution of otherwise licit goods 
and services (Castells and Portes, 1989).   11 
microentrepreneurs. Informal activities are not necessarily traditional or 
marginal, but can be part of the modern capitalist economy and have some 
capacity for capital accumulation. T hus, informal activities are closely articulated 
to activities in the formal sector through the supply of low-cost goods and 
services for workers in formal enterprises. Another interface between the formal 
and informal sectors derives from the practice of  large firms to reach down into 
the informal labor pool to allocate a variety of production and marketing tasks. 
The mechanisms at play are twofold: direct hiring of workers off-the books; and 
subcontracting of production, input supplies, or final sales to  informal 
entrepreneurs. The incentive for these linkages is lower labor costs and 
increasing managerial flexibility (Portes and Schauffler, 1993). In this situation, 
the informal sector may expand rather than contract in response to increased 
labor demand  during period of economic growth. Recognizing the internal 
heterogeneity of the informal sector, the structuralist perspective classifies 
informal activities as: 1) direct subsistence activities; 2) informal activities 
subordinate to production and marketing in the formal sector; and 3) 
autonomous informal enterprises with modern technology and some capacity 
for capital accumulation. Estimates are based on coverage of social security 
(Castells and Portes, 1989; Portes and Schauffler, 1993; Portes, 1994; Portes, 
Dore-Cabral and Landolt, 1997). Studies using the structural articulation 
approach are generally based on city case studies and in-depth interviews 
(Lanzetta and Murillo, 1989). 
 
Fourth, the entrepreneurial approach sees the informal sector as an 
unregulated, yet dynamic, sector of small-scale entrepreneurs, which may be 
broadly integrated with the formal sector. According to this view, informality may 
arise as a way to avoid the inefficiencies of labor market regulation as well as 
the regulations themselves: inefficiencies in the provision of social security 
(medical benefits or pensions), promotion systems are not based on merit, or 
other distortions that make being paid in cash more desirable (Maloney, 2001; 
Maloney and Nuñez, 2001). Many informal workers enter the sector voluntarily 
and are able to remain largely outside the formal regulatory structures. 
Presumably, aspiring entrepreneurs wait for an auspicious business climate 
before leaving a protected job to launch their enterprise because they are more   12 
likely to fail during a downturn, which explains pro-cyclical patterns of entry and 
exit predicted by the dualistic view (Maloney, 1997). This approach also 
considers a heterogeneous informal sector, composed of: 1) self-employed 
including owners of informal firms; 2) informal salaried; and 3) contract workers. 
Self-employed and contract workers may represent successful types of 
entrepreneurship, but serve different clientele: contract workers with large 
formal sector firms, and the self-employed with a market more oriented toward 
services or small customers. The informal salaried group may behave as 
predicted by the traditional dualistic view of the function of informality.  This 
approach measures the informal sector as owners and workers in firms under 
16 employees who do not have social security or medical benefits and are 
therefore not protected (Maloney, 1997; Maloney, 1999; Maloney, 2001). The 
entrepreneurial approach largely relies on the study of the Mexican informal 
sector, although there are  some estimates for other Latin American countries 
(Maloney, 1999). 
 
The differences in conceptualization of the informal sector rely largely on four 
key elements: state regulation, size of the firm, dynamism, and integration. The 
first two elements affect  the size of the urban informal sector, whereas the last 
two are related to its function. State regulation is a common feature in all four 
approaches, suggesting an implicit consensus that the informal sector refers to 
activities taking place outside established institutional rules. However, the 
reasons for the existence of unregulated activities differ  – because of survival 
strategies, functional requirements, inadequate regulatory system, or 
inefficiencies of the labor market regulations  -, and then their  function in the 
labor market and the implications in terms of labor policies also differ. Table 1 
summarizes the view of each approach in relation to each of the key elements. 
 
The next sections of the paper evaluate the outlined competing approaches to 
the urban informal sector. The excessive regulated approach is not included 
given the limitations of the available data to operationalyze the concept behind 
this approach. Therefore, only the dualistic (old and new PREALC view), 
structural articulation and e ntrepreneurial approaches are evaluated. I 
operationalize first the concept for each approach and examine the implications   13 
in terms of size and their limitations. Second, after adopting a specific definition, 
I analyze the dynamism and integration characteristics. The dynamism of 
economic activity is expected to capture subsistence vs. entrepreneurship 
activities  -heterogeneous internal composition  -, and therefore it is analyzed 
through class of worker. The integration attribute is intended to capture the 
degree of integration between formal and informal sectors  - the function of the 
informal sector  - and therefore it is analyzed through indicators of relative size 
and earnings and a crude indicator of labor mobility to/out sectors.  
 
4.2. Implications on its size 
 
At the national level, the majority of national estimates of Colombian urban 
informal sector, including the official statistics produced by the National 
Department of Statistics (DANE), consider the informal sector as marginal, low 
productivity, and small-scale enterprises, and mainly use size of the firm and 
work class as measurement variables (Lopez, 1996; 1996; Caro, 1995). Few 
additional efforts have been conducted to include institutional regulation 
elements (health care benefits) in the empirical  definition of the informal sector 
at a national level (McEwan, 1993; Nunez, 2000; Caro, 1995).  
 
In this section I analyze the implications on the size of the Urban Informal 
Sector (UIS) of the competing empirical definitions underlined in section 2. 
Given the available data, the state regulation element in the informal sector 
definition is measured through coverage of the health care system
8.  This 
indicator is a good proxy for regulated labor relations for two reasons: first, 
although the quality of these data may be poor for some Third World countries, 
it is good in the case of Colombia; second, the enrollment cost in the health 
system is high, especially for self-employed workers.  
 
                                                   
8 I use only health insurance coverage since it is the common variable in the 8 surveys. Only the 
last three surveys, 1996, 1998 and 2000, inquire about pension benefits.   14 
Firm size is measured as a dichotomy: small vs. large firm size. Small f irms 
refer to firms with 10 or less employees
9. Table 2 summarizes the specific 
definitions used here to measure the size of the UIS according to the 
conceptualization of each approach.  
 
Although state regulation is a common to all three conceptualizations, PREALC 
does not considered this feature in its estimates. They use entire class of 
worker and firm size as the key variables defining the informal sector. Class of 
worker alone is used in the old conceptualization. In the new conceptualization, 
they add firm size and characterize the informal sector by small scale of 
operation, labor intensive production with outdated technology, low levels of 
productivity, and low levels of capacity for accumulation. Thus, PREALC’s 
empirical focus excludes its core conceptual element: regulation. 
 
In contrast, the structural articulation approach relies entirely on the state 
regulation element, and therefore it includes all owners / workers in all class of 
worker and all firms that do not offer health care benefits. The  entrepreneurial 
approach considers both state regulation and firm size elements and therefore it 
is a special case of the structural articulation approach: unprotected workers 
working in small firms. However, given the particular characteristics of 
unremunerated family workers and domestic servants, those categories are 
considered as part of the informal sector in all four operational definitions10. 
Government employees are considered formal workers. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the estimated size of the  informal sector, that is the proportion of 
employed population working in the informal sector. 
 
PREALC figures give the extreme estimates of the UIS size. On one hand, old-
PREALC concept gives by far the lowest estimate, confirming that it largely 
underestimated the UIS by omitting workers in small enterprises. On the other 
hand, new-PREALC definition yields estimates above the other two competing 
                                                   
9 I used 10 or fewer employees as the cutting point given the categories used in the survey 
questionnaire: 1, 2 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 and more. A cutting point of 5 employees could be too low 
for manufactured goods although it would be acceptable for other sector industries such as 
personal services. I preferred to work with the same cutting point for all industry sectors. 
10 As we will see later in this paper, these two class of worker are mainly direct subsistence 
unregulated activities, representing 4% to 8% of the total employed population.   15 
approaches. Excluding old-PREALC estimates, the size of the UIS ranges from 
47% to 55% in 1984, and from 38% to 54% in 1996, and from 47% to 61% in 
2000. The differences in size of informal sector based on the three definitions 
are significant: they vary from 8 to 16 percent points.  
 
The dualistic new-PREALC approach estimates the highest sector size, being 
the differences respect to the other two approaches higher at the end than at 
the beginning of the analyzed period. Health insurance coverage is not a 
defining element in the dualistic new-PREALC approach, but it is the core 
element in the other two approaches.  Therefore, the increasing differences on 
estimates based on the three definitions from 1992 to 1996 could be associated 
with a combined result of both the effects of the 1993 health insurance reform – 
creating a mandatory health system  - and the effects of the 1990-95 healthy 
economic conditions  – increasing real earnings facilitated health insurance 
coverage. However, the fact that the proportion of the labor force with health 
care benefits was affected mainly among workers of small firms and that it 
decreases during the economic crisis as fast as it increases during the 
economic recoveries (see Table 3), suggests that health insurance coverage 
response can be associated more to the economic cycle than to the health 
reform
11. Given the trivial variation in h ealth insurance coverage among workers 
of large firms, the differences in the UIS size among the structural articulation 
and the entrepreneurial approaches are basically constant over the period.  
 
The dramatic increase in the size of the UIS after 1996 is common to all three 
approaches and the differences across them are almost constant. This clearly 
occurred during a period of deep economic crisis, with a declining employment 
rate, a declining proportion of salaried workers, an increasing proportion of self-
employed, and a declining labor income  – especially among less educated 
population (Ocampo et al., 2000).  The declining labor income during the crisis 
and the high cost of health insurance for those in the contributive system, 
                                                   
11 Changes in the wording of the question cannot be associated to these changes. Although the 
wording of the question effectively changed, it did from 1996 on. Between 1984-1994, the 
question was a multiple choice referring to the existing parallel health systems. From 1996 on, 
the question is a b inary choice (yes/no) referring to health coverage trough any health care 
institution.   16 
especially for self-employed workers led, after 1996, to declining health 
insurance coverage among workers in small firms (including self-employed
12) 
(Table 3).  
 
The above results suggests that the effect of state regulation (through health 
insurance coverage) on the estimated size of the UIS is important, especially 
after 1992, or after the implementation of the health system reform. It would 
seem that the health reform has had the unintended consequence of increasing 
the sensitivity response of health insurance coverage to economic cycles 
among workers of small firms. This could be explained by the higher enrollment 
cost brought by the reform, especially among self-employed workers.  Not-
considering health insurance coverage, as the new-PREALC definition does, 
overestimates the size of informal sector by almost 10 percent points in relation 
to the structural articulation measure and 15 points in relation to the 
entrepreneurial approach. There is no reason why the empirical estimations of 
the dualistic new-PREALC approach have excluded the state regulation 
element when it is the core elements of its conceptualization. Of course, state 
regulation refers to more than just health care benefits. It refers to laws and 
administrative rules established by the state covering social security  legislation, 
commercial licensing, labor contracts, financial credit, and the like (Portes, 
1994). However, considering at least one of these dimensions is better than 
excluding the element at all.  
 
At the opposite extreme, the entrepreneurial approach yields the lowest 
estimate of the UIS size. Limiting the UIS to those unprotected workers in small 
firms underestimates the size by at least 5 percent points in relation to the 
structural articulation estimate. Non-protected workers of large firms, which 
accounts for 15% to 17% of workers in large firms (Table 3), may reflect those 
activities oriented toward decreasing labor costs of formal sector firms through 
off-the books casual hiring and subcontracting (Castells and Portes, 1989). 
                                                   
12 Although the Law 100 establishes that the subsidized regime is only for non-working poor 
population, it is possible that some poor self-employed workers are covered by the subsidized 
regime if they applied for it when they were unemployed and then did not change their working 
status, or if they classify themselves as unemployed even though they are effectively self-
employed workers (and declare as such in the survey). T his situation would over-estimate the 
size of the UIS, especially for poor self-employed workers.   17 
Those are activities performed beyond government regulations and, since the 
state regulation is one core element in the conceptualization of the informal 
sector, they should be included. They may not represent a very important group 
of informal activities (excluding them underestimates the UIS size by 5 to 7 
percent points), but they may play a very different function than other sub-
sectors of the informal sector.  
 
According to the structural articulation approach, the IUS size is estimated in 
52.6% in 1984, 44.4% in 1996 and 51.7% in 2000. It may be that it 
underestimates the size of the IUS since its empirical definition is based only on 
one dimension of the state regulation element  – health insurance coverage. 
However, as mentioned above, the only common feature among approaches is 
precisely that the UIS refers to unregulated activities. Therefore, it is mandatory 
to include at least one dimension of the institutional regulation element. I have 
therefore opted here for the concept of informal economic activities as 
developed by the structural articulation approach: “ it is a process of income 
generation characterized by one central feature: it is unregulated by the 
institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar 
activities are regulated” (Castells and  Portes, 1989). Although a useful 
definition, one observation has to be made: it is wholly contingent on the 
regulatory context and this may differ from time to time and from place to place. 
In the particular case of Colombia, the Pensions and Health Insurance reform of 
1993 changed the context of the health care system: although it has important 
elements towards a universal coverage, higher equity, and better quality of 
health services, it increased the labor costs of hiring new workers as well as the 
costs of enrollment in the contributive health regime, especially for self-
employed workers. The reform may have had the unintended consequence of 
increasing the response of health insurance coverage, and then of unregulated 
activities, to economic cycles among employees in small firms. This does not 
mean that health insurance is not a good proxy for unregulated activities. On 
the contrary, this indicator may accentuate the function of the informal sector 
and its sub-sectors in the labor market. 
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5.  Internal Composition of the Urban Informal Sector 
 
5.1. An Empirical Functional Classification 
The different approaches for the analysis of the UIS agree not only with the type 
of activities that the informal sector encompasses (unregulated), but also with 
the heterogeneity o f the sector. I aim for a classification of informal activities 
that reflects the dynamic feature of the informal sector that distinguishes 
subsistence from entrepreneurship activities. 
 
Some studies have proposed classifications of informal activities according to 
particular criteria. For example, Maloney (1997) suggests a classification of 
three subgroups according to the expected relation with the formal sector: 1) 
Self-employed including owners of small firms; 2) Informal salaried, those 
working in informal firms; and 3) Contract workers, those who do not receive a 
regular wage or salary, but who are paid on a piece rate, on commission, or by 
fixed contract. In the Colombian case, the self-employed and owners of small 
firms are generally very different t ypes of workers (Fedesarrollo, 2000). Self-
employment mostly includes street vendors whereas small firms refer mainly to 
small entrepreneurs. The inclusion of those two groups in the same category 
may generate confusing results.  
 
However, Portes (1994) and other studies propose a functional classification of 
informal activities according to their goals (Portes, 1994). These include: 1) The 
survival of the individual or household through direct subsistence production or 
through a simple sale of goods and services in the market; 2) Decreasing labor 
costs of formal sectors firms through subcontracting of entrepreneurs and off-
the-books hiring; 3) Capital accumulation by small firms through greater 
flexibility and lower cost. I consider that this classification, according to the 
goals of the activity, is more appropriate to capture the internal composition of 
the Colombian urban informal sector, and then I embrace this classification. 
 
To represent the motivation of the activity, the empirical definition of the  internal 
sub-sectors of the informal sector uses firm size and dynamism (vitality) of 
economic activity as the classifying elements. Firm size was already defined:   19 
small vs. large. Since the dynamism of economic activity is expected to 
distinguish subsistence from entrepreneurship activities, it uses class of worker: 
owner, salaried, self-employed, unpaid family worker and domestic servant. 
Since only owners and salaried workers should be classified by firm size, six 
sub-sectors of the informal sector are i dentified: owners of small firms
13, 
salaried workers of small firms, salaried workers of large firms, self-employed, 
unpaid family workers and domestic servants. The last three categories could 
be identified as informal activities with direct subsistence goals; salaried 
workers of large and small firms are activities with decreasing labor costs goals; 
owners of small firms are activities with capital accumulation through lower cost 
goals. Next sections evaluate this classification by characterizing the sub-
sectors in terms of institutional regulation, demographic, and economic 
characteristics.  
 
5.2. Complying with the institutional rules 
 
Based on the conceptualization of the structural articulation approach, the 
informal sector refers to owners and workers in any firm size who do not have 
health care benefits and are therefore not protected, plus unremunerated family 
workers and domestic servants. These last two class of worker are included, 
whether they have health insurance or not, since they are mainly performed 
outside the social security and labor legislation and regulation terms. On 
average, almost 80% of domestic servants and 91% of unpaid family workers 
do not have health insurance coverage, 55% and 61% of domestic servants are 
paid below the minimum wage/hour, and work above the maximum number of 
legal hours worked/week, respectively (Table 4).  
 
Health insurance coverage as the defining feature of informal activities well 
captures differences between the formal and informal sectors in terms of the 
fulfillment of labor legislation rules (Table 4). Pension insurance is the most 
evident example: almost everyone in the informal sector has no pension 
insurance, whereas 73% of formal workers do have it. Less than 9% of formal 
                                                   
13 Although owners of large firms could conceptually be defined as part of the informal sector if 
they do not have health insurance coverage, it is in fact an empty group.   20 
workers but as high as 20% of informal salaried in large firms and 32% of 
informal salaried in small firms escape the minimum wage regulation
14. Labor 
legislation on minimum wage and maximum number of hours worked
15 applies 
only to salaried workers, excluding owners, self-employed and domestic 
servants, although the latter are also paid by a wage. However, their earned 
incomes and numbers of hours worked are beyond legal guidelines, especially 
among domestic servants: 55% receive less than the legal minimum wage/hour 
and 61% work more than the  maximum number of hours/week established by 
law (Table 4). 
 
Complying with the state regulations is affected by economic cycles and by the 
regulatory context. Although domestic servants and unpaid family workers are 
included as sub-sectors of the informal  sector, they increasingly comply with the 
established labor obligations, especially domestic servants. The proportion of 
domestic servants with health insurance consistently increased between 1988-
1996, during the periods of positive economic growth and the implementation of 
the health reform, but remained almost constant during the period of economic 
crisis – after 1996 (Table 5). 
 
In particular, the increase in health insurance among domestic servants after 
1988 seems to be an effect of Law 11 of 1988 
16,  reinforced later by the health 
reform of 1993. For unpaid family workers, the small increases in the proportion 
insured observed during the first periods of positive economic growth were lost 
during the crisis period, suggesting the disadvantaged conditions of this group 
of workers (Table 5).  
 
The declining employment rate, the increasing unemployment rate, and the 
diminishing real incomes observed during the period of deep economic crisis, 
led to an increase  – after 1998  – in the proportion of workers below the 
                                                   
14 Escaping the minimum wage regulation among formal workers can be done through the 
number of hours worked and/or using contract workers. 
15 According to Labor Legislation, youth 12-13 years old can work 4 hours/day, youth 14-15 
years old can work 6 hours/day, and those 16 years of age or older can work 8 hours/day. 
16 Law 11, 1988, established exceptions for domestic service enrollment to the Social Security 
System: for those with a monetary salary below the minimum wage, payments to the system 
could be based on the monetary remuneration whenever this is above half a minimum wage.   21 
minimum wage, in all sub-sectors, including the formal sector, except domestic 
servants (Figure 3). 
 
The higher fulfillment of domestic servants in relation to minimum wage rules, 
seems to be related to a higher compliance with the legal maximum number of 
hours worked/week (Figure 4). On the contrary, other sub-sectors of the labor 
market, especially the formal sector, have increased the proportion exceeding 
the hours/week legislation terms. It would seem that domestic servants is a 
group of the informal sector that has been affected most by the changing 
regulatory context occurring in the country during the last 15 years, including 
the labor and the health system reforms. However, they are still a group in great 
disadvantage with particular characteristics that justify including it as a separate 
sub-sector of the informal sector. By contrast, workers in all other sub-sectors, 
including the formal sector, have experience a worsening of their labor 
conditions. 
 
5.3. An empirical characterization  
 
The aim of this section is to characterize the sub-sector workers according to 
demographic and socio-economic conditions, in order to confirm the 
classification opted in this paper- that proposed by the structural articulation 
approach. 
 
Feminization of all sub-sectors of the labor market 
The increasing participation of women in the labor force observed in the country 
during the last decades is reflected in an increasing proportion of women 
among employed population: from 37.8% in 1984 to 44.4% in 2000. The 
feminization of the labor market is observed across all sub-sectors, maintaining 
the gender differences: women are over-represented among domestic servants 
and unpaid family workers, whereas there is a female deficit among workers in 
the other informal sub-sectors, especially among owners of small firms (Figure 
5). The higher female deficit among owners of small firms can be explained by 
women’s common disadvantage in respect of materials assets and credit   22 
access. Formal workers, on the contrary, reflect the female  feminization of the 
whole labor market.  
 
An employment life cycle: informal - formal - informal 
Colombian labor force has been aging as a consequence of the fertility 
transition experienced since the late 1960’s. The mean age of the working age 
population increased from 31.9 in 1984 to 35.6 in 2000, and the mean age of 
the employed population increased from 33.9 to 36.4 during the same period of 
time. Figure 6 shows the age distribution of the employed population by sub-
sector in 1984 and 2000. Two facts e merge from the figure. First, the aging of 
the population has affected all sub-sectors but two  – informal owners of small 
firms and self-employed (the mean age
17 and the age distribution of these two 
groups have not significantly changed). Second, there is  an employment life 
cycle associated to long run movements between formal and informal sub-
sectors, although it has been diminishing through time. 
 
Informal salaried workers of both large and small firms are consistently younger 
than formal workers and these in turn are consistently younger than informal 
owners of small firms and self-employed.  Informal salaried workers of small 
and large firms are then initial sub-sectors for young employees. Domestic 
servants and unpaid family workers also absorb a high p roportion of young 
workers: more than 65% in 1984 and more than 50% in 2000 in those 
categories are younger than 30 years of age. As workers grow adults and get 
experience in the informal salaried sub-sectors, move towards the formal sector 
(mostly large f irms) but yet as salaried workers. As they get older and have 
accumulated experience and  - may some of them  - have also accumulated 
capital, they return to the informal sector as owners of small firms or as self-
employed. This employment life cycle suggest long run informal  – formal  – 
informal movements. It is not just a life cycle from small to large to small 
enterprises, as pointed out by Lopez (1996), but it is a life cycle that starts in the 
informal sector (in both small and large enterprises) and ends up in the informal 
sector (in small enterprises). Roberts (1989) observed a similar household life 
                                                   
17 Mean age is presented as the number in parenthesis next to each legend in the graph.   23 
cycle, among Mexican males. In spite of the clear and persistent life pattern, it 
has been diminishing through time  - declining mean age differences across sub-
sectors. This tendency can be associated to the socio-demographic changes 
observed in the country (fertility, education), but not so to the economic cycle 
nor to the structural reforms observed in the country during the last decades: it 
has been smoothly occurring through time. 
 
Informal sector receiving most of recent migrants but it affects only domestic 
servants sub-sector 
More than half of the working age population living in the ten main cities is 
migrant: 57% in 1984 and 51% in 2000. Recent migrants, those with less than 
one year of residence in the city, represent only between 3% and 2.4% of total 
working age population in the city. Around 60% of these recent migrants 
participate in the labor market and almost half of them get a job. The informal 
sector absorbs most of the employed recent migrants: from 70% to 60% (Figure 
7). 
 
However, the internal distribution of employed recent migrants by sub-sector 
has significantly changed during the period according to the economic cycle. 
Informal salaried workers in small firms are the only sub-sector that employs a 
similar proportion of recent migrants during the period: one sixth goes to this 
sub-sector independently of the economic cycle. Domestic servants sub-sector 
consistently decreases its importance a s the main destination of recent 
migrants, which can be related to the declining importance of rural-urban 
migration during the last decades (Flórez, 2000). Still, the proportion of 
employed recent migrants in the formal sector consistently increased from 
27.6% in 1984 to 42.2% in 1998, especially during the economic upturn phase 
1992-1994, but it declined again to 33% in 2000, a year of deep economic 
recession. Informal salaried workers in large firms behave similarly to the formal 
sector: it shrinks its a bsorption of recent migrants during the economic crisis. 
The informal self-employed sub-sector does the opposite: it absorbs a higher 
proportion of recent migrants during the period of negative economic growth, 
that is from 1996 on. This different, but related to the economic cycle, 
absorption of employed recent migrants by sub-sector suggests a different   24 
function of each sub-sector in the labor market, hypothesis that will be tested 
latter in this paper. 
 
Given the relative small recent migration flows arriving to the main cities (3% of 
total working age population), the other impact on each sub-sector is very small, 
with the exception of domestic servants, which is a relative small sub-sector that 
receives high proportions of recent migrants. Figure 8 indicates that recent 
migrants represent 2% to 4% of the employed population in each sub-sector, 
with the exception of domestic servants where they represent a higher but 
declining proportion:  from 17.4% in 1984 to 11% in 2000. 
 
A more educated labor force with stable educational differentials 
The educational level of the Colombian population as well as its labor force has 
been increasing during the last decades as part of the socio-economic 
transformations experienced by the country. Consistently, educational 
improvements are observed in all labor market sub-sectors, and the educational 
gaps remain almost the same (Figure 9).  
 
Formal workers are more educated than informal workers in any sub-sector: 
they have 11 years of education in 2000. Among the sub-sectors of the informal 
sector, informal owners of small firms and informal salaried of large firms are 
the ones with higher educational level: 9.3 years in 2000. Domestic servants 
constitute the group with the lowest level of education: 5.6 in 2000. Although 
informal self-employed individuals have two more years of education than 
domestic servants, they are behind the other sub-sectors of the informal sector 
in completed years of education: 7.5 in 2000.  
 
Very low stability for salaried informal workers in both large and small firms 
Although temporary job and number of years working in the current firm as 
indicators of stability make sense only for salaried workers, they give us an idea 
of how workers of the other sub-sectors consider the stability of the activity they 
are doing. Informal salaried workers in both small and large firms have similarly 
high unstable labor conditions. At least 32% of them have a temporary job, and 
this proportion increases as much as 50% during the economic crisis of the end   25 
of the 1 990’s (Figure 10). In contrast, formal workers and owners of small firms 
hold the most stable jobs: on average, 9% of them have a temporary job. 
Informal self-employed, unpaid family workers and domestic servants are 
between salaried informal and formal workers: 15% to 22% of them consider 
their jobs as temporary. The increased labor flexibility introduced by the labor 
reform of 1990 led to an increasing proportion of temporary jobs in all sub-
sectors of the labor market, including the formal sector. This t endency was 
reinforced by the deep economic crisis of the end of the 1990’s. It seems that 
formal workers were most affected by the labor reform, as proportion of formal 
workers with temporary jobs consistently increased from 6% in 1984 to almost 
19% in 2000. However, informal workers were most affected by the economic 
crisis, especially informal self-employed, where the proportion of temporary jobs 
increased from 20% in 1994 to 36% in 2000 (Figure 10). 
 
Job turnover is reflected in the distribution of workers by number of years in the 
firm. Informal salaried of both small and large firms have the highest proportion 
of workers with less than one year in the firm (at least 50%) and the lowest 
proportion of workers with five or more years in the firm (at most  20%), 
suggesting a very high turnover rate among these workers. Formal workers face 
low turnover rates: 15% and 45% of them have been in the firm less than one 
year and five or more years, respectively (Figure 11). 
 
However, job turnover in all sub-sectors, but especially those in the informal 
sector, mainly salaried of both large and small firms, have increased during the 
period of economic crisis of the late 1990’s.  Thus, trends in both job turnover 
and temporary jobs indicators suggest a deterioration o f labor stability 
conditions for workers in all sub-sectors, including the formal sector, but 
especially for informal salaried of both large and small enterprises, which has 
been reinforced by the economic crisis. 
 
Informal salaried workers are over-represented in construction and 
manufactured goods industries 
More than three fourths of total employment in Colombia is generated by three 
industries: personal services, commerce and manufactured goods. However,   26 
during the last decade, manufactured goods have l ost relative employment 
shares (from 23.6% in 1984 to 18.8% in 2000), whereas personal services 
industry (government services) has shown a weak but positive growth rate, 
absorbing an increasing proportion of employed population (from 28.5% in 1984 
to 31.8% in 2000) (Ocampo et al, 2000). This productive structure of the 
economy is reflected in both the formal and informal sectors of the labor market: 
in all sub-sectors, at least 75% of employment is generated by these three 
industries (Table 6). However, there are important differences in the industry 
composition by sub-sector. For example, in 2000, as high as 61% of unpaid 
family workers but only 20% of informal salaried workers of large firms were 
employed in commerce industry (Table 6). Informal salaried w orkers of large 
firms and formal workers have similar distributions by industry (higher 
proportion in personal services) whereas informal owners and informal salaried 
workers of small firms are more alike (higher proportion in commerce). This 
suggests integration in the production process. On the contrary, informal self-
employed and unpaid family workers have particular distributions by industry: 
the first ones have equal proportions of workers in commerce and personal 
services, whereas the last ones are highly concentrated in commerce industry. 
 
Figure 12 presents, for the 1984-2000 period, the distribution of workers by 
industry for each sub-sector, in terms of deviations from the mean  (total labor 
market). The three main industries plus construction are  selected for the 
analysis. Some facts must be pointed out. First, unpaid family workers are over-
represented in commerce industry, being employed mostly (around 50%) in 
petty commerce  (“tiendas”  – Table 6). Informal self-employed, informal owners 
of small firms, and informal salaried workers of small firms are also over-
represented in commerce industry but to a much lower degree. More than 30% 
of self-employed are in petty commerce, referring mainly to street vendors 
(Table 6). At least one fourth and one  fifth of owners of small firms and informal 
salaried workers of small firms, respectively, are also in petty commerce. 
Informal salaried workers of both small and large firms are over-represented in 
construction and manufactured goods industries (mainly in textile and leather 
production activities- Table 6). Informal salaried workers in large firms are 
mainly contract workers  - the type of employment used to decrease labor costs   27 
in the production process. This explains the significant changes in the 
proportion of this type of workers in construction industry
18 (decrease) as well 
as in manufactured goods industry (increase) during the period of economic 
crisis (late 1990’s).  
 
Informal workers don’t always earn less: formal workers earn more than 
informal salaried but owners of small firms may earn even more 
Earnings or wage comparisons among informal sub-sectors and the formal 
sector may not be straightforward since they do not reflect all other 
characteristics and benefits associated to each possible job. Some examples 
can be mentioned. Formal sector pays benefits (health insurance, pensions, 
housing subsidies, etc), may have cleaner and safer places, but at the same 
time its payments must take out different taxes (income and labor taxes) and 
the job conditions (schedule) may be less flexible. These differences, which are 
valued by the workers and affect in different direction the total earnings, are not 
included in the simple comparisons of monetary earnings. However, available 
data do not allow adjusting for  non-monetary earnings besides those payments 
in kind (food and housing).  
 
Table 7 indicates that informal self-employed and domestic servants are sub-
sectors with the lowest earnings/hour, in both economic boom and crisis 
periods. Informal salaried of large firms earn more than informal salaried of 
small firms but less than formal workers. On the contrary, informal owners of 
small firms may earn more than formal workers but are highly affected by the 
economic cycle: that is, during economic upturns earn more but during 
economic crisis may earn less. Besides these earnings differentials across sub-
sectors, a general trend emerges from Table 7: deterioration in wages of 
workers in all sub-sectors, including those in the informal sector. There are an 
increasing proportion of workers in the lower tail of the earning distribution 
(below half minimum wage or below one minimum wage). 
 
                                                   
18 Construction industry was one of the activities with the most negative indicators during the 
late 1990’s economic crisis (Ocampo, 2000).   28 
The previous demographic and socioeconomic differences among workers 
suggest that it is not possible to characterize the informal sector as just one 
homogeneous group. The informal sector is very heterogeneous, composed of 
sub-sectors with different goals, different characteristics and maybe different 
functions. Table 8 summarizes the characteristics of workers in the different 
informal sub-sectors and the formal sector. As a first approximation, the six 
informal sub-sectors are grouped in three according to their goals and similar 
characteristics. First, there is a disadvantaged group whose main goal is  direct 
subsistence composed of s elf-employed, unpaid family workers and domestic 
servants. This group shares similar characteristics such as: high proportion of 
women, high proportion of recent immigrants, low educational levels, initial and 
final phases of life cycle, low earnings, and  working in commerce (as street 
vendors or in petty commerce-“tiendas”) and personal services industries (in 
household services). Second, there is a group of informal salaried workers in 
large and small firms,  informal subordinated group, whose activities h ave the 
goal of decreasing labor costs – for formal large firms or for informal small firms. 
This group is composed mainly by young men (initial phase of life cycle), 
established migrants, middle high educational level, highly unstable labor 
conditions, middle high earnings and working in manufactured goods (textile, 
leather and wood) and construction industries. Third, there is a group of owners 
of small firms,  informal entrepreneurs, whose goal is accumulation of capital 
through lower costs. It is composed mainly by men in a late phase of life cycle, 
non-recent immigrants, middle high educational level, working in small 
commerce and manufactured goods (textile, leather), with high earnings. 
Finally, outside the informal sector, there is the group of  formal workers, whose 
activities have the goal of capital accumulation. It is composed mainly by adult 
(middle phase of life cycle), highly educated workers, in manufactured goods 
and personal social services industries, with high labor stability and high 
earnings. 
 
This proposed classification differs from structural articulation classification. 
Informal salaried of small firms are grouped here with the informal salaried of 
large firms given their similar characteristics although their products serve 
different c lientele: informal salaried of large firms with large formal sector firms,   29 
informal salaried of small firms with small entrepreneurs (formal or informal), 
perhaps with products (final goods) more oriented towards small customers. 
 
5.4. Evolution of the internal composition of the UIS 
 
According to figure 2 (Section 4), informal sector represents about half of the 
employed population. As a whole it shows a counter-cyclical behavior: it shrinks 
with the economic up-turns and expand with the economic crisis (its size was 
estimated in 52.6% in 1984, 44.4% in 1996 and 51.7% in 2000) (Figure 2). On 
the other hand, previous section clearly indicated that the informal sector is not 
a homogeneous sector but it is composed of sub-sectors that are 
heterogeneous in relation  to their goals and characteristics. The point now is the 
relative size of each sub-sector. Is there an over-represented sub-sector such 
that we can still talk about just “one” informal sector?  
 
Figure 13 presents the internal composition of the informal s ector through the 
period. Three facts must be pointed out from the graph. First, informal self-
employed represents 44% to 54% of the informal sector, and direct subsistence 
group adds up to 52% to 63%. This group, of course, leads the behavior of the 
whole informal sector. However, the informal salaried or subordinated group  – 
with very different characteristics and goals  – is not a marginal group: it 
represents 30% to 40% of the urban informal sector, a size large enough to 
influence informal activities. T he informal entrepreneurial group, although not 
very large, represents 5% to 9% of the informal sector.  
 
Second, the internal composition of the UIS changes with the economic cycle: 
the direct subsistence group shrinks during the economic upturns and expands 
during the crisis  – as the whole UIS does-, whereas the opposite is true for 
informal salaried and for small entrepreneurs groups. Third, self-employed sub-
sector has a higher size-elasticity to the economic cycle, indicating higher 
flexibility of these types of activities. The last two facts mean that not only sub-
sectors have different characteristics but also that they are playing different 
functions in the labor market.  
   30 
The changing composition of the urban informal sector and the size of its sub-
sectors suggest that we cannot talk about “the” urban informal sector  – as “one” 
sector  - but we must differentiate at least three groups: direct subsistence, 
informal salaried or subordinated, and entrepreneurs.  
 
6.  The function of the urban informal sector in employment 
 
Under the dualistic view, in cyclical downturns, the informal sector is thought to 
absorb displaced formal sector workers, informal earnings fall relative to those 
in the formal sector, and then the sector contracts during economic up-turns as 
the availability for good jobs increases again. Informal and formal sectors are 
integrated, the counter-cyclical pattern of the dualistic view can be inverted, and 
the informal sector can expand during periods of economic up-turns and shrinks 
with economic crisis. The previous section suggested that urban informal sub-
sectors do not seem to respond in the same way to economic cycles. Are any of 
them, or none, linked to the formal sector? Are all sub-sectors survival 
mechanisms to limited formal jobs?  T hese types of questions are addressed in 
this section where I look at the function of each informal sub-sector in the labor 
market (marginality element and absorption of the unemployed / new labor 
force) through comparisons of their relative sector sizes a nd earnings, and a 
crude indicator of labor mobility. 
 
In order to avoid selectivity bias and to consider the effects on the labor market 
size of the socio-demographic and structural changes as well as of the 
economic cycles, the analysis of the function o f the informal sector must include 
the working age population and not only the employed population. Therefore, 
the population under analysis is the working age population and two more 
groups were added to the six identified sub-sectors of employed population: 
those unemployed and those out of the labor force. 
 
6.1. Relative sector size and earnings 
 
Figure 14 shows the evolution of the sectoral composition of the working age 
population. Table 9 presents the correlation coefficient between the GNP grow   31 
rate  – lagged one year  – and the relative size of each sub-sector. The formal 
sector, as expected, behaves pro-cyclically. Informal self-employed shows a 
counter-cyclical behavior: it remains almost constant during the economic up-
turns but significantly increases i ts share during the deep economic crisis of the 
late 1990’s, reaching its maximum in 2000. A high negative coefficient 
correlation confirms this behavior. Unpaid family workers and domestic servants 
also show a counter-cyclical behavior, their share decreases during the 
economic up-turns and increases again during the crisis, but the relative size-
elasticity to the economic cycle is much higher among self-employed. This 
behavior of the direct survival group seems to support the bulk of the literature 
on informality that claims the informal sector expands while formal sector 
employment falls during economic crisis. However, survival activities of the 
informal sector expanded less than expected whereas open unemployment 
expanded more rapidly. Thus, in spite of the significant increase of the direct 
survival sub-sector, it has a limited capacity to absorb all dismissed workers 
from the other sub-sectors (formal and informal) as well as new incoming 
workers to the labor force, and the effect is an increasing open unemployment. 
Although there are available workers to go into the labor market, and in 
particular to the direct subsistence sub-sector, they would push earnings further 
down (even to zero) as labor supply largely exceeds demand (Portes, et al., 
1997). Thus, in the presence of large labor surplus and an already large size of 
the direct subsistence sub-sector, the response of the labor market to 
increasing dismissed workers has been through open unemployment.  
 
Contrary to survival informal activities, informal salaried workers of large and 
small firms as well as small entrepreneurs overall behave pro-cyclically as the 
formal sector does (positive coefficient correlations). However, the size-
elasticity to economic cycles is higher in the formal sector. Thus,  informal 
salaried and entrepreneurial sub-sectors, as well as the formal sector, shrink as 
unemployment expands. The similarity of the behavior of informal salaried of 
large and small firms confirms that both represent activities with goals of capital 
accumulation through lower costs but maybe serving different clientele: informal 
salaried of large firms with formal firms and informal salaried of small firms with 
small entrepreneurs (formal or informal). The pro-cyclical behavior of informal   32 
subordinate group and informal entrepreneurs suggests that there is an 
articulation of formal and informal salaried sub-sectors, both directly, through 
subcontracting and off-the books hiring, and indirectly, through the demand side 
of final goods. A contraction of formal employment would negatively affect the 
demand for informal (final and intermediate) goods and services. Several 
authors suggest this hypothesis. As Portes et al (1997) argument: “Informal 
producers and vendors do not live in a world apart from the firms  that are so 
regulated. Instead, the two types of enterprises are closely intertwined through 
a variety of arrangements, providing goods and markets for each other” (pp. 
21). And for the new-PREALC informal sector, Lopez (1996) points out: "The 
demand source of the informal sector, in the Colombian conditions, is 
conformed by the wages paid in the formal sector of the economy" (pp. 12). 
 
The unemployed group shows a strong cyclical behavior (very high negative 
coefficient correlation). Unemployment reaches i ts minimum in 1994 at the 
height of the economic boom and reaches its maximum in 2000 at the height of 
the economic crisis. Being out of the labor force does not seem to behave as 
the repository of discouraged workers, rather it appears to be a luxury: it 
increases during the economic boom  – early 1990’s  - and it falls as the 
economy gets into the worse economic crisis  – late 1990’s (positive coefficient 
correlation). The persistent decline during the second half of the 1980’s, when 
the economy was “well-behaved”, is consistent with the structural changes 
observed in the country, especially the rapid increase in educational level 
among women. 
 
Figure 15 shows absolute and relative median hourly real earnings
19. Although 
the interpretation of earnings differentials cannot be straightforward  – earnings 
do not include characteristics of the job (Maloney, 1997)  -, one can assume that 
the unobserved arguments remain constant, and look for trends over time. 
Some points emerge from the graph. First, domestic servants are the worst paid 
                                                   
19 Earnings include monetary and in-kind payments. Unpaid family workers are excluded since 
they do not receive monetary neither in-kind payments. Relative earnings refer to the earnings 
of the sub-sector relative to the formal wage.   33 
in the labor market, although their relative earnings improved during the late 
economic crisis.  
 
Second, informal salaried workers in small firms appears to earn consistently 
less than informal salaried in large firms and these, in turn, earn less than 
formal workers. However, their earnings relative to formal sector wage have 
roughly remained the same during economic upturns and downturns. It seems 
then that displaced formal workers (Figure 14) are not pushing down earnings in 
these sub-sectors, opposing to what the dualistic view would predict. On the 
contrary, they behave much as the formal sector does, suggesting again a close 
integration between these sub-sectors with the formal sector (through 
subcontracting and off-the-books hiring), and/or a binding wage affecting both 
formal and informal salaried workers. As Maloney and Nuñez (2001) affirm, 
“although not enforced by law, the minimum wage appears to be an important 
benchmark for “fair” remuneration” (pp. 9).  
 
Third, informal owners of small firms receive generally more than formal 
workers. Their relative earnings behave pro-cyclically: slightly increase with 
economic upturns and significantly decrease with economic crisis. Given both 
relative size and earnings behave pro-cyclically (Figure 14), it may indicate that 
informal entrepreneurs are integrated to the formal sector through the demand 
side of final goods. Only the deep economic crisis of the late 1990’s  – when real 
earnings declined  - has produced earnings among informal entrepreneurs lower 
than earnings among formal workers: relative differences declined from 1.2 in 
1994 to 0.75 in 2000.  
 
Fourth, informal self-employed workers receive hourly real earnings similar to 
informal salaried workers. However, informal self-employed earnings behave 
pro-cyclically, significantly declining during the late economic crisis. Given their 
relative size behaves counter-cyclically (Figure 14), this would imply that this 
sub-sector is absorbing displaced formal/informal sector workers such that they 
push down earnings, decreasing relative earnings of this informal sub-sector in 
relation to the formal sector: earnings among self-employed fall from 73% in 
1994 to 50% in 2000 of formal salaried wages. Finally, there is a decline in real   34 
earnings a mong workers of all sub-sectors  – except domestic servants  - during 
the period of economic crisis, producing a deterioration of economic conditions 
from the beginning to the end of the period. 
 
In sum, relative sub-sector size and earnings suggests that the informal direct 
subsistence sub-sector supports the dualistic view, whereas the informal 
salaried in both large and small firms (subordinated sub-sector) and informal 
entrepreneurs are integrated to the formal sector, both directly, through 
subcontracting and off-the-books hiring, and indirectly, through the demand side 
of goods and services. Informal salaried and informal entrepreneurship may be 
a desirable destination for many workers whereas informal direct subsistence 
sub-sector comprises involuntary, disadvantaged, or unpaid workers. However, 
direct subsistence sub-sector has a limited capacity to absorb workers so that 
during severe recessions open unemployment will rise. 
 
6.2. A crude indicator of labor mobility 
 
Labor mobility usually refers to movements from one type of employment to 
another. One can classify employment by occupation, work class, industry, firm 
size, economic sector (formal/informal), or even by economic activity 
(employed/unemployed/ out of the labor force). Since my aim here is to have 
additional signals of the function of the informal sector  - the degree of 
integration between formal and informal activities through absorption of labor- 
the ideal would be to refer to labor mobility as that occurring between the 
already defined sub-sectors of the labor market. However, I face limitations 
imposed by the data. Currently workers are asked by some general 
characteristics of their previous employment  - if they have had one  -, but health 
insurance coverage is not included
20. Therefore, we would loose the core of the 
informal sector definition in the measurement of labor mobility. I preferred then 
to look at a crude indicator of labor mobility that is the movement from the 
previous economic activity to current labor market sub-sector for workers  with 
                                                   
20 Occupation, work class, industry, firm size, unemployment/inactivity duration are included for 
workers with a previous employment   35 
less than one year in the firm
21 and its relationship to economic cycles. I defined 
three categories of crude labor mobility based on previous employment
22 and 
current formal/informal sub-sector: 1) direct mobility or direct movements from 
previous employment to the current one (employment-employment); 2) indirect 
mobility or the movement from previous employment to current one through an 
unemployment / out of the labor force spell (employment  – unemployment/out of 
the labor force  – employment); and 3) n ew workers that is those entering into 
the labor force from an unemployment/out of the labor force episode without 
any previous work experience. Mean unemployment/out of the labor force spell 
duration between previous and current employment is estimated for those 
workers with previous labor experience as an indirect evidence of the function 
played by each sub-sector in employment. One would expect larger mean spell 
durations for those workers currently in the informal sub-sector(s) acting as a 
safety net that is playing a function as predicted by the dualistic approach. 
 
Workers without previous labor experience are over-represented among direct 
subsistence sub-sector, especially among unpaid family workers and domestic 
servants 
Independent of the economic c ycle, roughly one third of annually employed 
population in the whole labor market does not have any previous employment 
experience (Figure 16). Although the other two-thirds has some experience, the 
proportion with direct mobility (employment-employment) h as significantly 
decreased over the period but especially during the deep economic crisis of the 
late 1990’s: from 26% in 1986 to 7% in 2000. However, there are some 
differences in the type of mobility by sub-sector. Although decreasing, new 
incoming workers without experience are especially important (above the mean) 
among unpaid family workers (80% to 60%) and among domestic servants 
(45%), categories of the direct subsistence sub-sector (Figure 17). It seems this 
sub-sector is the open door to the labor  market for young less-educated new 
                                                   
21 The analysis is limited to workers with less than one year in the current firm/job as a  proxy of 
annual labor mobility. 
22 As pointed out by López (1996), previous employment has a different meaning for 
subordinated workers and independent workers. For subordinated workers, as salaried workers, 
domestic servants and unpaid family workers, changes of employment refer to changes of 
employer/firm but not to changes of occupation. On the other hand, for independent workers 
(self-employed and owners) changes of employment refer to changes of work class or changes 
of industry.   36 
incoming workers. On the contrary, although consistently declining during 
economic crises, direct mobility (employment-employment) is over-represented 
(above the mean) among informal owners of small firms. This would suggest 
that informal small owners quit their previous jobs only after being established 
as entrepreneurs (there is no unemployment / out of the labor force spell), and 
their labor mobility would be a voluntary one. Even more, informal owners of 
small firms seems to behave like small firm sectors everywhere: in general, they 
face high failure rates and the proportion quitting their jobs to open informal 
small businesses decreases during economic downturns (Figure 17).  
 
Although informal salaried workers of both large and small firms are consistently 
younger than formal workers (section 5.3 above), inexperienced workers are not 
over-represented among the incoming salaried workers to the informal sector. 
Salaried workers, whether formal or informal, have similar  type of labor mobility 
(Figure 17): about 30% come without any labor experience, half of them have 
indirect labor mobility (with unemployment/out of the labor force spell), and 
about 20% have direct labor mobility (coming directly from a previous 
employment). This means that, although younger, most of incoming salaried 
informal workers have a previous labor experience as most of formal workers 
do.  
 
Very high duration of unemployment spells among informal direct subsistence 
workers 
The mean duration of unemployment / out of the labor force spells between the 
current and previous jobs
23 significantly increases during the deep economic 
crisis of the late 1990’s: from 11 to 36 weeks (Table 10). Clearly, economic 
downturns not only increase the unemployment rate  (section 3 above) but also 
push upward the duration of unemployment spells for workers in all sub-sectors. 
However, currently informal self-employed and unpaid family workers show 
unemployment spells well above the mean, indicating that this group of workers 
– compounding the informal direct subsistence sub-sector  – does not take the 
current job as a voluntary option but it may represent the only and last 
                                                   
23 Estimated only for those workers with indirect labor mobility.   37 
employment alternative (Figure 18). It would mean then that this sub-sector is 
acting as a safety net a bsorbing dismissed labor from other sub-sectors. On the 
contrary, the informal salaried sub-sector (both large and small firms) behaves 
similarly to the formal sector: there is no significant difference between their 
unemployment spells. This would suggest that informal salaried sub-sector is 
not a safety net but it is maybe a voluntary choice for workers as the formal 
sector is. 
 
Although informal owners of small firms with indirect labor mobility have an 
unemployment / out of the labor force spell duration larger than the mean and 
their spell duration also increases with the economic downturn, their spell 
duration-elasticity to economic cycles is lower than the observed in the other 
sub-sectors. This does not imply that informal small entrepreneurship is 
absorbing dismissed labor but it could just imply that opening a new business 
takes longer time in economic downturns than it regularly does. 
 
In sum, the constructed crude indicator of labor mobility and the mean duration 
of unemployment spells confirm the hypothesis raised in previous section, 
namely that informal direct subsistence sub-sector behaves as the dualistic 
view would predict whereas small entrepreneurs and informal salaried sub-
sectors are integrated to the formal sector and behave similar to i t, based on 
employment status. 
 
7.   Final remarks 
 
The evaluation of the dualistic, structural articulation and entrepreneurial 
competing approaches to the informal sector suggests that it is necessary to 
consider the institutional regulation element in its c onceptualization. It is not 
only the core of the concept but it has implications on its measurement size. 
The benefits and shortfalls of each approach led me to opt for the concept of 
informal economic activities as developed by the structural articulation 
approach: “ it is a process of income generation characterized by one central 
feature: it is unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social 
environment in which similar activities are regulated” (Castells and Portes,   38 
1989). However, it m ust be noted that a definition based on the regulatory 
dimension is wholly contingent on the regulatory context and this may differ 
from time to time and from place to place.  
 
Using health care benefits as a proxy for institutional regulation
24, the 
Colombian urban informal sector reached a size in 2000 similar to the one 
observed in 1984, 52% of employed population, after being as low as 44% in 
1996. It seems that the higher costs of hiring new workers and the higher costs 
of enrollment in the contributive health regime brought by the Pensions and 
Health Insurance Reform of 1993, may have had the unintended consequence 
of increasing the response of health insurance coverage, and then of 
unregulated activities, to economic cycles. 
 
The internal composition o f the urban informal sector shows that it is wrong to 
talk about “the” informal sector. It is a heterogeneous sector, composed at least 
of three sub-sectors  – direct subsistence, informal salaried or subordinated, and 
small entrepreneurs  - whose goals, characteristics, and function differ. 
Consequently, then the implications of labor policies also differ for them. 
Although the direct subsistence sub-sector comprises most of informal workers 
(50% to 60%), the informal salaried sub-sector is by no means a marginal 
group, representing 30% to 40% of the informal sector. Relative sub-sector size 
and earnings and a crude labor mobility indicator suggest that the informal 
direct subsistence sub-sector behaves counter-cyclically whereas the 
subordinated sub-sector ( informal salaried in both large and small firms) and the 
informal entrepreneurs behaves pro-cyclically. That is, the first group supports 
the dualistic view, whereas the other two are integrated to the formal sector, as 
the structural articulation and the  entrepreneurial approaches suggest, both 
directly, through subcontracting and off-the-books hiring, and indirectly, through 
the demand side of goods and services. Besides this short-run articulation, 
there also exists a long-run life-cycle articulation between informal salaried, 
formal sector and informal entrepreneurs. Informal salaried and informal 
                                                   
24 Although health insurance is a good proxy for institutional regulation, it is necessary to include 
more indicators in the household surveys to be able to capture more precisely those activities 
taking place outside established institutional rules.   39 
entrepreneurship may be then a desirable destination for many workers 
whereas informal direct subsistence sub-sector comprises involuntary, 
disadvantaged, or u npaid workers. However, direct subsistence sub-sector has 
a limited capacity to absorb workers so that open unemployment rose during 
the severe economic crisis of the late 1990’s, reaching its highest value, 20.4%, 
in 2000. 
 
It seems that the structural “neo-liberal” reforms of the 1990’s that significantly 
modified the labor market environment, not only have had the unintended 
consequence of increasing the response of unregulated activities to economic 
cycles but they have also have the unintended consequence of increasing the 
level of precariousness of the labor force. On one side, the economic conditions 
of workers in all sub-sectors, including the formal sector, have worsened during 
the period: longer working day and lower earnings, lower stability and h igher 
turnover. On the other side, the higher size-elasticity of the informal direct 
subsistence sub-sector to economic cycles lead to a significant increase of this 
sub-sector during the severe recession of the late 1990’s, representing, in 2000, 
almost t wo thirds of the informal sector, one third of the employed population 
and around one fourth of the labor force (economically active population). The 
limited absorption capacity of this sub-sector and the excess of labor supply led 
to very high levels of o pen unemployment during the economic crisis. Thus, in 
2000, almost half of the labor force, 47%, and almost 30% of the working age 
population was unemployed or was employed in the informal direct subsistence 
sub-sector!.  
 
It is true that in 1984 the figures were not very different: 42% of the labor force 
was unemployed or employed in the informal direct subsistence sub-sector. 
However, the structural neo-liberal reforms of the 1990’s and the globalization 
of the economy make the environment of the labor market and that of the 
economy very different now. The gains obtained from 1984 to 1994 towards a 
formalization of the economy were lost in only five years, reaching levels of 
informalization in 2000 even higher that the ones observed in 1984.  
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This current picture of the Colombian labor market could support the hypothesis 
suggested by Mercedes Gonzalez de la Rocha for the case of Mexico on the 
“erosion of the resources-of  –poverty model of survival in light of the ongoing 
economic crisis faced by the poor h ouseholds” (2001). The current high open 
unemployment rates and the increasing proportion of workers in the informal 
direct-subsistence sub-sector will produce even higher deterioration of real 
income and survival sources. This in turn will produce an increasing gap 
between the employed (formal or informal salaried / entrepreneurs) and those 
unemployed or employed in the informal direct subsistence sub-sector. It seems 
then that we are observing a trend toward a divergence between small groups 
of workers in medium and high productivity jobs and a much larger group of 
workers in low jobs or unemployed. Is this evidence that new segmentation 
features are emerging as Gonzalez de la Rocha, Portes and others (“Out of the 
Shadows” Conference, 2001) have suggested  it? It is possible that workers in 
the formal and informal salaried and entrepreneur sub-sectors become more 
homogeneous and form a group of “privileged” workers versus a group of 
“excluded or disadvantaged” workers. This is a hypothesis that deserves 
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Table 1: Conceptualization of the Urban Informal Sector by Approach 
 
 
Table 2: Urban Informal Sector definition by approach 
 
Approach  Empirical definition of the Urban Informal Sector 
Dualistic  – Old 
PREALC 
Self-employed  – minus professionals and technicians, 
unremunerated family workers, and domestic servants. 
Dualistic  – New 
PREALC 
Self-employed  – minus professionals and technicians, 
unremunerated family workers, domestic servants, 
owners and salaried workers in small firms. 
Structural articulation  Owners and workers who do not have health insurance 
and are therefore not protected (includes all 
unremunerated family workers and domestic servants). 
Entrepreneurial  Owners and workers in small firms who do not have 
health insurance and are therefore not protected 










Approach   






State regulation  Unregulated  Unregulated  Unregulated  Unregulated 
Size of the firm  Small  Any  Any  Small 
Integration  None  None  High  High 
Dynamism  Low    High  High 
Firm Size
Year Small Large Total
1984 17.9 85.7 47.0
1986 17.8 84.2 46.0
1988 20.7 85.3 47.3
1992 22.3 83.9 48.6
1994 25.8 83.1 51.3
1996 31.7 84.3 54.9
1998 28.5 84.8 51.7
2000 26.0 85.4 47.7
Table 3: Proportion of  Workers covered by




























Regulation term Formal Inf. Owner Inf. SalariedInf. Salaried Inf self- Unpaid-fam Domestic
worker small firm small firm large firm employed worker servant
Health coverage 91.3 79.1
Pension coverage* 27.2 99.0 99.4 97.6 99.0 99.4 99.6
Legal min wage/hour 8.6 20.0 31.7 20.0 40.7 55.4
Legal max # hours/week 26.6 50.4 37.0 32.6 36.2 36.9 61.0
* Refers to 1996-2000
Table 4: Mean proportion of employed population outside state regulation terms by sub sectors 1984-2000
Domestic Unpaid fam









Table 5: Proportion of Domestic Servants and Unpaid



























1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
Agriculture 1.7 1.7 2.2 4.1 1.4 2.2 1.7 2.3 1.2 0.9 1.6 1.0 1.5 1.5
Manufactured goods 26.4 21.4 26.2 25.0 25.7 23.2 24.8 26.1 14.5 13.1 21.4 22.5 22.8 18.8
     Food, beberage 4.1 4.5 4.4 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.6 1.1 1.8 7.4 8.9 3.4 3.6
    Textile, leather 8.6 6.9 10.3 8.7 8.8 9.3 8.9 9.1 8.8 6.8 8.2 9.6 8.5 7.1
    Wood 1.4 0.8 4.6 4.0 5.0 3.8 3.4 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.3 0.8 2.1 1.4
Electricity-gas-water 1.0 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7
Construction 4.5 2.5 13.7 10.3 10.6 8.1 19.5 8.1 8.2 7.2 1.5 2.0 7.2 4.8
Commerce 20.1 20.2 35.9 39.9 28.8 33.2 20.9 20.2 41.4 36.7 66.0 61.0 26.1 26.8
    Petty commerce 15.5 15.7 27.4 25.2 20.3 21.7 14.9 12.8 36.7 32.4 56.0 49.1 20.9 21.2
    Restaurants, hotels 2.6 2.7 7.3 13.3 7.9 10.4 4.1 6.0 3.5 3.6 9.5 10.5 3.7 4.3
Transport/Communic 6.4 8.5 3.3 2.5 9.6 8.1 9.9 7.9 6.9 7.2 0.8 0.8 6.7 7.5
Financing Services 11.2 12.0 3.0 5.8 3.1 5.7 6.2 7.7 4.1 3.9 1.8 1.4 7.6 8.0
Personal Services 28.7 32.7 15.7 12.5 20.5 19.4 16.7 27.6 23.7 30.5 6.9 11.3 100.0 100.0 27.5 31.9
    Social services 14.0 16.2 2.8 1.3 3.6 4.1 7.5 14.3 1.9 2.1 0.4 1.4 8.8 9.6
    Household services 6.0 7.9 11.6 8.7 14.8 11.9 4.5 5.9 20.3 25.9 5.4 9.7 100.0 100.0 13.3 16.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
employed fam worker Servant worker small firm small firm large firm Total
Table 6: Distribution of workers by industry by sub-sector. 1984-2000 (%)
Formal Inf. Owner of  Inf. Salaried of Inf. Salaried of Inf. Self- Unpaid Domestic
Earnings/hour in
Minimum wages 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
< 0.5 0.9 3.0 3.9 20.2 4.4 8.1 1.8 2.9 10.9 16.6 9.3 9.7
0.5 to < 1 6.1 10.2 9.4 18.7 21.9 31.4 15.9 23.4 21.4 25.0 45.1 37.8
1 to < 2 44.3 43.3 29.3 28.2 53.6 43.8 54.4 43.9 35.0 32.4 38.1 39.0
2 to < 3  20.0 15.7 21.3 9.5 12.1 7.8 14.2 10.6 15.7 11.9 4.4 6.2
3+ 28.7 27.7 36.0 23.4 8.0 9.0 13.6 19.2 17.0 14.1 3.1 7.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Monetary and in-kind payments
Inf. Self- Domestic
worker small firm small firm large firm
Table 7: Distribution of workers by earnings*/hour by sub-sector. 1994 and 2000 (%)
employed servant
Formal Inf. Owner of  Inf. Salaried of Inf. Salaried of  47
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Relative size within Formal Inf. Owner Inf. Salaried Inf. Salaried Inf. Self- Inf. Unpaid Inf. DomesticUnemploy Out labor Out labor
worker small firm small firm large firm employed fam worker servant force not-st force
Working age population 0.38 0.51 0.28 0.66 -0.75 -0.12 0.00 -0.84 0.49 0.39
Economically active population 0.72 0.67 0.44 0.73 -0.74 -0.03 0.12 -0.82
Employed population 0.39 0.53 0.17 0.68 -0.84 -0.10 -0.03
Informal sector 0.67 0.55 0.75 -0.60 -0.08 0.05
Table 9
A. Correlation coefficient between lagged GDP growth rate and sub-sector relative size
Relative size within Formal Informal Informal  Inf. Direct Inf. Direct Unemploy
worker Entrepr. Salaried Subsist Subsist 2
Working age population 0.38 0.51 0.48 -0.81 -0.82 -0.84
Economically active population 0.72 0.67 0.62 -0.56 -0.76 -0.82
Employed population 0.39 0.53 0.42 -0.75 -0.85
Informal sector 0.67 0.71 -0.77 -0.70
B. Correlation coefficient between lagged GDP growth rate and sub-sector relative size
Current sub-sector 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 0
Formal worker 10.6 10.8 10.3 9.8 9.4 9.9 10.7 34.6
Inf. Owner small firm 12.5 11.8 12.5 13.3 12.5 12.0 16.5 28.9
Inf. Salaried small firm 8.4 10.0 9.7 9.5 8.8 8.2 10.8 33.1
Inf. Salaried large firm 8.1 9.8 9.1 8.3 7.7 8.6 9.6 32.2
Inf self-employed 13.9 18.0 17.4 16.9 15.6 13.5 16.2 42.8
Domestic servant 7.1 8.3 8.8 9.3 8.3 7.1 10.5 36.0
Total 9.9 11.3 11.0 10.7 9.9 9.7 11.8 36.2
*Includes only workers with indirect labor mobility


























 Source:  Dane, DNP. Banco de la República, 2000.   Source: Dane, 2000.
Source: Fedesarrollo, 2001. Source: Fedesarrollo, 2001.
Figure 1: Macro Indicators and Labor Market Indicators. 1984-2000
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Figure 2: Size of the informal sector: Competing approaches
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Figure 11: Proportion of workers with <1 year and with 5+ years in the firm by sub-sector
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Figure 13: Internal composition of the urban informal sector
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Figure 15:  Hourly real earnings by sub-sector
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Figure 16: Type of mobility for workers with less than 1 year in the firm
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*Includes only workers with indirect labor mobility
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